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In this paper, we estimate the costs of state failure, both for the failing state itself and 
for its neighbours. In our analysis, the cost of failure arises from two distinct sources: 
organized violence due to the incapacity of the state to ensure its own citizens’ security 
and low quality of regulation and public goods due to poor governance.  
To estimate the cost of failure, we proceed in two steps. First we estimate the annual 
loss of growth induced by state failure. Then we cumulate this loss over time, taking 
into account the chances that each year a failing state will exit this status. Our growth 
estimations suggest that a failing state at peace loses 2.6 percentage points of growth per 
year, while violence induces a further loss of 1.6 percentage points of growth per year.  
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From this, we deduce that states lose around 5 times their initial GDP due to bad 
governance and a further 0.65 times their initial GDP due to large-scale violence. Using 
the average GDP of a failing state and taking into account the fact that there are on 
average 23 failing states, the total cost of failure for the population of these countries, 
expressed as a net present value, is around US$784 billion (US$39 billion per year). 
We also find that the cost of failure for the neighbours is similar whether the country is 
at peace or at war. Neighbours lose around 0.6 percentage points of growth each year. 
Cumulating over time and taking into account the fact that a typical failing state has 
around 3.5 neighbours, we find that the total loss for the neighbours is around US$4,730 
billion, expressed as a NPV. The annual cost to neighbours is around US$237 billion  
Our results suggest that the total annual cost of state failure is very large; for example, it 
far exceeds expenditures on global aid. Moreover, around 80 per cent of the cost is 
borne by neighbours of failing states: failing states are costly mainly because they inflict 
externalities on others.  
Acronyms 
CPIA  Country policies and institutional assessment (World Bank) 
LICUS  low-income countries under stress 
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1 Introduction 
In this paper we estimate the costs of a ‘failing state’. Such costs are of evident interest 
because they are a necessary first step towards a cost-benefit analysis of remedies. 
However, the costs of a failing state may also have a more fundamental significance. If 
state failure produces large spillover costs to neighbours there may be good reason to 
rethink the conceptual foundations of sovereignty, shifting some sovereignty from the 
nation to the region, and in the process empowering international intervention. 
The most basic role of the state is to provide physical security to its citizens through 
maintaining a monopoly of organized violence within the society. Where the 
government fails to do this and rival organizations of violence emerge, the state 
descends into civil war. However, in the modern world the demands legitimately placed 
upon the state extend beyond this basic function of security. Governments in all modern 
societies play some role as regulators of private economic activity, and as suppliers of 
public goods such as transport infrastructure, health and education. The quality of 
regulation and public goods is important for the capacity of citizens to earn a living. 
Increasingly, as globalization makes economic activity more mobile between countries, 
the quality of government matters in a relative rather than an absolute sense: 
governments that are much worse than others are likely to lose economic activities and 
this will rebound upon their citizens. Hence, a state can fail because its government 
provides a quality of regulation and public goods which is markedly worse than that 
provided by other governments. Throughout this paper we are agnostic as to why states 
fail and concentrate on estimating the costs of state failure. 
Some of the costs of failure arise from organized violence. Such costs are likely to be 
different from the costs arising from a failure of governance. In addition to these costs 
we also consider spillover effects to neighbouring countries. In section 2 we consider 
these three distinct costs in more detail and the following three sections quantify each of 
these costs in turn. Section 6 draws the implications.  
2  Failing states and sovereignty 
States can ‘fail’ in three distinct ways: they can hurt citizens in neighbouring countries, 
they can fail to provide basic security for their own citizens, and they can fail to provide 
an environment in which poverty reduction is feasible. We take these in turn. 
In an inter-connected world, social and economic catastrophe in one country spills over 
onto neighbours. This contrasts with the state of the world when the concept of national 
sovereignty was formulated in the seventeenth century. Then, both a nation’s economy 
and its society were very largely independent of other nations. Sovereignty as 
traditionally formulated thus does not take into account the costs that catastrophe inflicts 
on other countries. If these costs are ‘large’, the governments of such countries have a 
reasonable claim to the right of intervention in order to reduce them. Regardless of the 
rights of governments to inflict costs on their own citizens, it would be a radical 
extension of the concept of sovereignty for them to have the right to inflict large costs 
on neighbours. The magnitude of spillover costs is critical. Since all states inflict some 
costs on neighbours, only if they occasionally exceed a high threshold can such costs 
constitute an operational qualification to sovereignty.    2
The second basis for a dilution of sovereignty is the global concern to mitigate social 
catastrophe in any country. This may primarily be a response to the globalization of 
television news coverage. In September 2005 the UN unanimously endorsed the 
Responsibility to Protect, which creates the right to intervene if a government 
relinquishes its responsibility to protect, whether by lack of will or lack of capacity.
1 
‘Responsibility to protect’ is defined as protection of citizens from large-scale violent 
conflict that the government is either unwilling to prevent or incapable of preventing, 
but which international intervention could feasibly curtail. While international concern 
is recent, the concept of the state as providing security to its citizens through the 
possession of a monopoly of violence is at the root of the traditional conception of what 
constitutes a state. Governments that do not provide such a monopoly are thus ‘failing’ 
in this fundamental sense.  
The third basis for a dilution of sovereignty is a counterpart to the responsibility 
proposed by the UN to provide aid to assist poverty reduction. Underpinning the norm 
that the governments of OECD countries should contribute 0.7 per cent of GDP as aid, 
is that in the extreme conditions of low-income countries, poverty reduction is not 
exclusively a national responsibility. Implicit in this responsibility of OECD countries 
to provide finance was a counterpart responsibility of the governments of low-income 
countries to manage their affairs in such a way as to be conducive to poverty reduction. 
These twin responsibilities of aid and governance were formally recognized in the 
Monterrey Consensus of 2000. Just as some OECD states are failing to provide the level 
of aid judged to be adequate for poverty reduction, so some governments of low-income 
countries are failing to provide policies and governance judged to be adequate and this 
failing inflicts avoidable poverty on their citizens. The threshold of policies and 
governance necessary for poverty reduction is intrinsically less clear cut than that for 
aid. Nevertheless, there is now a reasonable internationally-generated threshold, namely 
that used by the World Bank to define low-income countries under stress (LICUS). 
LICUS are defined using the annual global rating of policies and governance known as 
the Country Policies and Institutional Assessment, CPIA, (World Bank 2002). Despite 
limitations, the CPIA is a serious professional attempt to provide a rating that is 
comparable both between countries and over time. Nor is the concept of an identifiable 
class of countries in which the government is failing to provide an adequate 
environment for poverty reduction confined to the World Bank. The Development 
Assistance Committee of the OECD, which represents all bilateral aid programmes, 
adopted the closely equivalent concept of Difficult Partnerships. An identifiable group 
of governments of low-income countries can thus reasonably be described as failing to 
provide an adequate environment for the attainment of the objective of the reduction of 
severe poverty. In turn, the international community has judged this objective to warrant 
international pressure for governments to meet target norms. Just as international 
pressure for the governments of OECD countries to meet a norm of aid finance is 
legitimate, so potentially it is legitimate to bring pressure on those governments that fail 
to meet a norm of policies and governance. Whether a governance threshold should be 
treated as a responsibility equivalent to an aid threshold depends again upon the scale of 
the costs inflicted by failure. If the costs of such failures of government are modest 
                                                 
1   The full text of UN Resolution A/RES/60/1 can be found at: 
www//daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement. 
  The responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity is set out in paragraphs 138 and 139.   3
relative to aid, then the interventions implicit in concerns about them would be 
unwarranted interference. 
There are thus three distinct types of cost that might define a ‘failing state’. Costs 
inflicted on neighbouring citizens, violence avoidably suffered by the state’s own 
citizens, and poverty avoidably suffered by the state’s own citizens. Where any of these 
costs are large there is a basis for qualifying sovereignty because they would either 
breach the rights or trigger the responsibilities of other states. 
In the following sections we quantify these three types of cost: neighbourhood 
spillovers, internal violence, and poverty. We show that not only is each of these costs 
large, but the same conditions generate all three costs. The results have two important 
implications. One is that because the costs are large, international intervention that 
shares or even overrides the claims of sovereignty is likely to be justified. The second is 
that all three criteria support a common working definition of ‘failing states’: a 
definable class of governments should not be regarded as being fully sovereign. 
The first cost we quantify is the poverty generated by policies and governance that are 
below the threshold set by the criteria for LICUS. We begin here because to a 
considerable extent the problem of large-scale internal violence, which is the second 
cost we quantify, turns out to be a by-product of this persistent poverty. Hence, the same 
conditions generate both persistent poverty and a high risk of violence. The third cost, 
spillovers to neighbours, turns out to be generated by both the stagnation common to 
LICUS, and large-scale violence.  
3  The cost to citizens of failing states of weak policies and governance 
Economic policies and governance differ massively between countries. Chauvet and 
Collier (2006) examine the opportunities for reform in failing states and provide some 
evidence that the most commonly found binding constraint is ‘political will’ due to a 
clash between elite interests and those of wider society. A further possibility of the 
underlying reasons for state failure is the lack of capacity to reform. However, in this 
paper we are not primarily concerned with the question of why states fail or what can be 
done about it but which costs they inflict on their citizens and those of neighbouring 
states. 
As suggested by Chauvet and Collier (2006), poor policies and governance are 
themselves the consequence of other factors such as particular configurations of interest 
groups. These deeper factors may reduce growth directly as well as via policies and 
governance. As a result, an apparent improvement that is divorced from underlying 
change may have only modest effects on growth. For example, interest groups may use 
other instruments to achieve their objectives and these may also be detrimental to 
growth. The poor policies and governance that define failing states should thus probably 
be regarded as the observable manifestations of a dysfunctional society. They can be 
thought of as lying on a continuum determined by their likely consequences for growth 
and poverty reduction. Potentially, a government ‘fails’ if it adopts policies and 
governance that persistently fall below some low threshold and so inflicts slow growth 
or even absolute economic decline on its citizens. We adopt the World Bank criterion 
for LICUS as defining such a threshold and combine it with a concept of persistence of   4
such poor policies and governance. To meet our criterion of persistence a country must 
fall below the LICUS threshold for a continuous period of at least four years. This is 
designed to exclude from the category of failing states those that merely suffer a 
temporary crash. Analogously, we wish to retain in the category of failing states those 
that having been below the LICUS threshold temporarily or weakly improve policies 
and governance a little above the threshold. A country exits the category of failing state 
only if it achieves a decisive improvement, by which we mean sustaining a level of 
policies and governance clearly above the threshold for at least three years. So defined, 
during the period 1998-2001 there were 23 such failing states which collectively 
accounted for only 7 per cent of the population of the developing world. We should 
note, however, that some countries that are evidently failing states on this criterion have 
been omitted due to missing data. Data are systematically more likely to be lacking if 
the state is failing. The most notable such omissions are Afghanistan and North Korea. 
Hence, the figure of 7 per cent is liable to be an underestimate with the true figure 
perhaps around 10 per cent.  
A likely, though not inevitable consequence of this level of policies and governance is 
that there is a failure in the normal growth process. Over the period 1990-2001 the 
average per capita growth rate of non-LICUS countries was 2.8 per cent whereas that in 
LICUS was only -0.06 per cent, in other words zero. The exceptions to this presumption 
of stagnation are generally associated with natural resource discoveries: for example, 
Equatorial Guinea has been able to have a high rate of GDP growth despite very weak 
policies and governance because off-shore oil production has come to dominate its 
small economy. 
Such stagnation only becomes critical in conjunction with both initially low income and 
the prolonged persistence of the inadequate policies and governance. The combination 
evidently results in persistent poverty. The same weak policies and governance in a 
country that was already at middle-income levels would not have such serious 
consequences. Hence, it is not that the international community should attach value to 
‘adequate’ policies and governance in themselves, but rather that they become 
significant in the context of initially low income. In practical terms, policy-induced 
stagnation in the Middle East is of far less concern for the objective of global poverty 
reduction than policy-induced stagnation in Africa. 
Our criteria of persistence have excluded by definition both temporary crashes that 
swiftly rebound and temporary improvements that quickly collapse, but they do not 
necessarily imply that the phase of inadequate policies and governance is prolonged. 
Chauvet and Collier (2005) use a logit regression to estimate the probability that a 
failing state will achieve a decisive exit from the condition. A few characteristics make 
exit significantly less likely: a small population and a low incidence of secondary 
education. In effect, turnaround is made harder if there are in absolute terms few well-
educated people in the society. Compared with other developing countries the typical 
failing state indeed has both of the characteristics that predict persistence. The typical 
failing state has a population of only 15 million as compared with 42 million for 
elsewhere, and a far lower proportion of its population have completed secondary 
education: 3 per cent against 12 per cent for other developing countries. At the mean of 
failing state characteristics the predicted annual probability of exit is a mere 1.7 per 
cent. In turn, this probability can be converted into the mathematical expectation of the 
duration of being a failing state: in effect, how long the typical failing state will remain 
in the condition. The expectation is 59 years. Hence, the typical low-income failing state   5
will indeed experience a prolonged period in which policies and governance are 
inadequate and so a high incidence of poverty is likely to be prolonged. 
During the period 1998-2001 despite accounting for only 7 per cent of the population of 
the developing world, the LICUS countries accounted for 15 per cent of the number of 
people globally living in absolute poverty of less than one dollar per day: their incidence 
of poverty was 40 per cent as compared to only 20 per cent in the other developing 
countries. However, this radically understates the importance of LICUS for global 
poverty. As stressed by Wood (2006), the challenge of global poverty must be 
understood in a dynamic context. Essentially, the objective is to minimize the number of 
person-years in poverty. Because the non-LICUS developing countries are generally 
growing quite rapidly, even though they currently have considerable poverty this is not 
likely to be persistent. If the growth rates noted above persist, then by 2015 per capita 
income will have increased from 2004 levels by 47 per cent in non-LICUS countries 
while being unchanged in LICUS. The elasticity of headcount poverty with respect to 
mean per capita income is around -2.0 (Ravallion and Chen 1997; Bourguignon 2000). 
Hence, the incidence of poverty can be expected to decline by approximately 5.6 per 
cent per year in non-LICUS countries while remaining constant in LICUS. By that time 
the LICUS countries would account for around 29 per cent of poverty instead of 15 per 
cent as of 2001. If these different growth rates persisted for a further decade, then in 
2025 LICUS would account for around 42 per cent. Recall that these are likely to be 
underestimates because of the omission of countries such as Afghanistan and North 
Korea. While such a projection to 2025 is evidently fraught with uncertainties, the past 
extreme persistence of the condition of being a failing state suggests that it is not 
completely unreasonable. As Wood discusses, quite how poverty is aggregated over the 
future depends upon choices such as the discount rate. However, on any reasonable 
discounting of the future it is clear that LICUS are a major part of the poverty challenge. 
Further, the very fact that so much poverty is concentrated in a few countries offers the 
potential for a highly focused strategy for poverty reduction. Growth in these countries 
is going to become increasingly effective relative to growth in other developing 
countries in reducing poverty. 
The OECD is currently providing aid to developing countries of the order of US$80 
billion. Were all OECD countries to meet the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GDP, aid 
would be increased by around US$135 billion. How do these figures compare with the 
costs inflicted on the citizens of failing states by poor policies and governance? To 
establish the latter we adopt the approach previously followed by Chauvet and Collier 
(2005), but using numbers specific to the present problem. 
First, in Table 1 we introduce a dummy variable for failing states into a growth 
regression covering a global sample of developing countries over the period 1974-2001. 
Because we wish to have a single regression which can be used for all the costs to be 
considered, we confine the present concept of failing states to those which are at peace, 
and introduce a second dummy for those which are also in civil war. We also include 
dummy variables for neighbourhood spillovers. These other dummy variables will be 
discussed in subsequent sections. Our core regression is OLS. However, to check the 
robustness of the results we repeat the regression using GMM. The results of both 
regressions are reported in Table 1. The GMM results coincide with those of the OLS: 
being a failing state at peace significantly reduces the growth rate by 2.6 per cent 
relative to being at peace with adequate policies and governance. Note that this estimate 
of the loss of growth is very close to the difference cited above between the average   6
failing state and the average for other developing countries during the period 1990-
2001. The 90 per cent confidence interval around this estimate, which we can use to 
provide confidence intervals around our estimates of cost, is also shown in the Table. In 
Appendix 1, we also provide some robustness checks on the specification by adding 
controls for education and investment, which are conventional growth determinants, and 
a measure of the degree of democracy. Note that we do not introduce either policy 
variables such as openness, inflation and the budget surplus, or institutional variables 
such as corruption and the rule of law, since these are already subsumed in the concept 
of a failing state and so incorporated into our dummy variable. None of these variants 
alters the results: the level of significance is sometimes reduced but the coefficients are 
always close to those of our baseline regression. 
We then combine this loss of growth with our estimate of the probability of a decisive 
turnaround from the condition, namely 1.7 per cent per year. For example, if a failing 
state is very fortunate, in the first year it will lose 2.6 per cent of GDP relative to the 
counterfactual of adequate policies whereupon it will achieve a decisive turnaround. 
Table 1 
Growth effect of failing states, 1974-2001 
   OLS  SYS-GMM 
  (1)  90 per cent confidence 
interval 
(2) 
        
Income per capita, t-4  -0.008 
(3.50)*** 
-0.012 -0.005  -0.005 
(1.08) 
Dummy non-failing states countries at war  -0.013 
(3.02)*** 
-0.021 -0.006  -0.008 
(0.83) 
Dummy failing states at war  -0.042 
(4.87)*** 
-0.056 -0.028  -0.033 
(2.56)** 
Dummy failing states at peace  -0.026 
(6.96)*** 
-0.032 -0.020  -0.024 
(3.64)*** 
Proportion of neighbours being FS at war  -0.018 
(2.20)** 
-0.032 -0.005  -0.062 
(3.09)*** 
Proportion of neighbours being FS at peace  -0.018 
(3.70)*** 




0.070 0.140  0.077 
(2.22)** 
        
Observations 600      600 
R-squared 0.17       
Number of countries  105      105 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value)        0.79 
Number of instruments        116 
AR(1) (p-value)        0.001 
AR(2) (p-value)        0.507 
Notes:  Regression (1) is estimated with OLS.  
  Regression (2) is estimated with System-GMM (Blundell and Bond 1998). All right-hand side 
variables are instrumented.  
  Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  Dependent variable: Growth rate of real income per capita, Penn World Tables 6.1.  
  All regressions include time dummies.   7
The ultimate costs of having been a failing state then depend upon what is assumed 
about post-turnaround recovery. At one extreme, growth post-turnaround is merely the 
same as if the country had always had adequate policies. In this case the loss is 
perpetual: every year in the future the country is 2.6 per cent worse off than if it had not 
had the phase of inadequate policies and governance. We adopt the more hopeful, and 
probably more reasonable, assumption that during the recovery phase growth is 
unusually rapid: the economy recovers to where it would have been without the failing 
state phase, and the recovery takes as many years as that phase has lasted. The cost of 
having been a failing state is then the loss of GDP in each year until the economy attains 
the level it would have reached had it not been a failing state, discounted to the present. 
We adopt a discount rate of 5 per cent. We allow for the possibility of turnaround in 
each year, weighted by the probability that a turnaround will occur in that year, and sum 
across all of these possible paths of development. This generates the mathematic 
expectation of the discounted present value of the cost of being a failing state, viewed 
from the first year in which the country enters the condition (see Appendix 2 for 
details).2 Our central estimate of the costs of the typical LICUS-at-peace is US$28 
billion, with the 90 per cent confidence interval from the growth regression giving a 
range of US$23 billion to US$32 billion. Table 2 summarizes these results.  
Even when we limit our analysis to those countries for which we have complete data 
there are 23 such states. Thus, our central estimate of the present value of the cost of 
failing states from the loss of GDP implied by inadequate policies and governance is 23 
times the cost-per-country, namely US$640 billion. Since this is a stock, to convert it 
into a sustainable flow comparable to global aid we again use a 5 per cent interest rate. 
Thus, were all failing states to achieve decisive change the gain would be approximately 
equivalent to a permanent income stream of US$32 billion per year. The likely 
correction for the omission of countries which lack data would increase this to around 
US$40 billion. Recall that this compares to aid levels of around US$80 billion. Since 
the gain would accrue exclusively to states with the highest incidence of poverty, it 
would be much better targeted than aid, much of which accrues to middle-income 
countries. Hence, were failing states to improve their policies and governance to the 
level prevailing in other developing countries, the pay-off, though less than the value of 
current aid flows, would be of the same order of magnitude. Thus, on the criterion of 
global poverty reduction these costs of failing states are sufficiently commensurate with 
aid to warrant a broad normative equivalence between the responsibility on OECD 
countries to provide aid and the responsibility of developing countries to provide 
adequate environments for economic development. Indeed, whereas aid has an evident 
opportunity cost in terms of the diversion of OECD government revenues from other 
uses, the reform of policy and governance, while it might damage some interests, has no 
equivalent broad social cost. 
 
                                                 
2   The convergence term in the growth estimations creates an inconsistency between the way we 
calculate the cost in Appendix 2—which does not account for any convergence—and our growth 
estimations. To check the robustness, we estimated regressions (1) and (2) of Table 1 without the 
convergence term. The results are very similar to those with the term. We thank Henrik Hansen for 
this comment.   8
4  The cost to citizens of failing states of large-scale violence 
We now turn to the second cost of a failing state, namely an enhanced risk of large-scale 
internal violence. For this we base our approach on that of Collier and Hoeffler (2004a), 
but again using numbers specific to the present problem. 
We continue to define a failing state on the basis of our previous criteria, except that 
now we confine the analysis to those states that are at war instead of those that are at 
peace. From the regressions reported in Table 1, the incremental loss to growth of a 
failing state that switches from peace to war is a further reduction in growth of 1.6 per 
cent. The typical civil war lasts around seven years (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 
2004). As with failing states at peace, the costs depend critically upon what is assumed 
about subsequent recovery. There is reasonable evidence that in the typical post-conflict 
situation the economy has a phase of above-normal growth (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004b), and based on this we assume that the economy fully recovers its pre-war growth 
path over a ten-year recovery period, with supra-normal growth of 1.1 per cent per year. 
Hence, purely in terms of loss of GDP, many of the costs of war occur after it is over: 
income is lower than it would have been for a prolonged period. We then discount these 
annual costs incurred during and after the war back to the time of war onset and express 
it as a present value. So measured, the loss of GDP consequent upon a civil war in a 
country that is in any case a failing state due to poor policies and governance, is US$4.8 
billion.  
We next estimate the incidence of civil war among failing states. For this we rely upon a 
model that estimates the risk of civil war developed by Collier and Hoeffler (2004c). 
Based on global data for the period 1965-99 they analyse the onset of 54 civil wars in 
terms of characteristics observable prior to the conflict and predict the risk facing each 
country for each five-year period. Among these characteristics, three that are distinctive 
features of failing states are significant. These are low per capita income, slow growth, 
and a small population. Keeping other characteristics constant at the mean for all low-
income developing countries, we use the model to predict the risk of civil war, first with 
the characteristics of failing states, and then with the alternative characteristics for the 
average of other developing countries. The risk for the typical failing state is 15.9 per 
cent per five-year period, as compared to only 7.8 per cent for other developing 
countries. Thus, with 23 failing states and an average five-year risk of 15.9 per cent, in 
the typical year 0.73 civil wars can be expected to break out, with an average cost of 
US$4.8 billion. Hence, the cost of civil war in failing states, purely in terms of the loss 
of GDP in those states, is around US$3.5 billion per year.  
Of course, these economic costs of civil war do not fully capture the cost as perceived 
by the international community. Countries that contribute to the very high level of 
international peacekeeping forces are in general not motivated primarily by a desire to 
avoid these economic costs, but rather by the desire to reduce mortality within the 
affected countries. Civil wars substantially increase mortality. Only a small part of this 
is due to deaths directly caused by combat. Most mortality is due to the increased 
incidence of disease. This in turn is caused partly by the weakening of public health 
systems, for example, it may no longer be possible to conduct vaccinations in combat 
areas. Additionally, civil war generates refugees, and the mass movement of refugees 
across territories in which they lack acquired immunity to infection, spreads disease. 
Since these effects are highly persistent, much of the mortality attributable to civil war 
occurs once it is over. Taking these effects into account, Collier and Hoeffler (2004a)   9
estimate that the value of the loss of life caused by the typical civil war is around US$5 
billion. We should note that in making this estimate they use a very low valuation of a 
year of life of only US$1,000. As, in the typical year, 0.73 civil wars can be expected to 
break out, the annual value of the loss of life caused by war is US$3.7 billion. Adding 
US$3.7 billion to the cost of the typical civil war estimated above increases the estimate 
of the annual cost of war from US$3.5 billion to US$7.2 billion. Since these are annual 
flows we accumulate them into a total stock, assuming as previously a discount rate of 
5 per cent. Thus, the net present value of the cost of violence is calculated at US$144 
billion. Even with this additional layer of costs, the costs of civil war to citizens of 
failing states do not come close to the costs of poor policies and governance. To the 
extent that the welfare of the citizens of failing states is the motivating concern for 
international intervention, it is therefore not enough just to ensure that these societies 
are peaceful. If intervention is warranted on these grounds, its primary concern must be 
to change policies and governance.  
While failing states are not the only source of civil war, they account for a 
disproportionate amount of it, just as they account for a disproportionate amount of 
poverty. The incidence of civil war in developed countries is negligible, so for practical 
purposes the costs of civil war are generated entirely in developing countries. Although 
failing states account for only 7 per cent of the population of developing countries, 
based on the differential risks discussed above, they account for half of the civil wars. 
Just as the challenge of poverty reduction needs to be considered in a dynamic context, 
so does the reduction of the incidence of civil war. The growth that other developing 
countries are on average experiencing is cumulatively further reducing their risk of civil 
war because higher levels of income reduce risk. Repeating the calculation of section 3, 
by 2015 the increase in per capita income in other regions of 47 per cent will have 
reduced the risk of conflict in those countries by 29 per cent, whereas if the failing 
states continue to stagnate, the risks will remain at their present high level. The share of 
global civil war accounted for by the failing states will rise to 60 per cent. On the same 
basis, by 2025 failing states would account for two-thirds of all civil wars.  
Evidently, the distinctively high risk of civil war in failing states is attributable to their 
distinctive attributes. The stagnation that is a consequence of poor policies and 
governance prevents risks declining as a result of growth. However, risks are also 
heightened because the typical failing state has a much smaller population than other 
developing states. The risk of civil war is considerably increased if a region is divided 
into many small countries. An interesting counterfactual that captures this effect is to 
estimate the incidence of civil war treating all failing states as if they were a region, and 
then changing the characteristics of the ‘region’ to those prevailing in other developing 
regions. To complete the thought experiment, we start all countries from peace and 
consider the number of wars that begin during the first five-year period. The ‘failing 
region’ experiences 3.7 outbreaks of civil war, whereas in a developing region with the 
same total population but the characteristics of other developing areas the incidence 
would be halved to 1.8 outbreaks. Note that part of this higher incidence is due to the 
small population of failing states. Thus, the sovereignty of failing states may need to be 
called into question not only because the choices of their governments have such 
important consequences, but because part of the solution may be to pool sovereignty 
with neighbours, who may themselves be failing states, to generate larger nations.   10
5  The costs to neighbours 
We now turn to the third cost, namely that inflicted on neighbours. Neighbours suffer a 
variety of costs from failing states, but here we concentrate upon the economic losses. 
Globally, growth spills over onto neighbours. On average, if all of a country’s 
neighbours grow at an additional one per cent, the country’s growth rate is increased by 
0.4 per cent (Collier and O’Connell 2007). Since being a failing state reduces growth, 
we would therefore expect neighbours to suffer reduced growth. We estimate the costs 
to neighbours by introducing the proportion of neighbouring countries that are failing 
states into the growth regression of Table 1. We distinguish between whether the state is 
failing only in the sense of having poor policies and governance, or whether it is also at 
civil war. In the OLS regression, in each case being the neighbour of a failing state 
significantly reduces growth. Potentially, the dummy variables may be proxying 
geographic effects that are common to failing states and their neighbours rather than 
indicating a causal relationship. We therefore investigate the robustness of the result 
through GMM. We continue to find significant effects of the same magnitude. 
First, we consider the spillovers from failing states that are at peace. Having such a 
neighbour significantly reduces the growth rate. From the OLS regression the loss, were 
all the neighbours to be failing states, would be 1.8 percentage points. Next, we consider 
the cost to neighbours if a failing state has a civil war. The growth loss for a country 
surrounded by failing states at war is the same as that for one surrounded by failing 
states at peace, namely 1.8 per cent, although taking into account the confidence 
intervals, this need not imply that the costs are literally the same. Combining the two 
effects, on average 33 per cent of neighbours are failing states.3 Thus, on average this 
adverse neighbourhood effect reduces growth by around 0.6 percentage points. This 
reduction in growth persists for as long as the neighbouring state continues to fail. We 
thus repeat the calculation of section 3 in which each year the failing state faced some 
probability of turnaround. 
The growth reduction of 0.6 per cent for neighbours of a failing state is larger than 
would be expected from the more general results on how a country’s growth is affected 
by that of its neighbours. Recall that a 1.0 per cent change in the growth rate of the 
neighbours on average changes the growth of the country by 0.4 per cent. Since the 
typical failing state suffers a growth reduction of 2.6 per cent, if all the neighbours were 
failing states this would imply a growth loss of around 1.0 per cent. Since only a third of 
neighbours are typically failing states the implied growth loss is around 0.3, or about 
half of the estimated loss of 0.6 per cent. This suggests that the routes by which a failing 
state reduces the growth of its neighbours extend beyond the reduced opportunities to 
trade due to slower growth of GDP. For example, trade opportunities may be further 
reduced due to the policies of the failing state such as high tariffs or poor transport 
routes. Some channels of transmission need have nothing to do with trade. For example, 
the failing state may give the neighbourhood as a whole a bad reputation with foreign 
investors. Neighbours might also have to divert public expenditures into containing 
some of the social or political problems that spill over, such as heightened risks of 
disease consequent upon the migration of refugees, or the need for a higher level of 
military spending. 
                                                 
3  Twenty-six per cent of neighbours are failing states at peace and 7 per cent are failing states at war.   11
We next use the loss of growth to estimate the cost that neighbours bear from a failing 
state. While the reduction in the growth rate of the neighbour is considerably less than 
that of the failing state itself, the typical failing state has 3.5 neighbours and the GDP of 
neighbours is on average considerably higher than that of a failing state itself. These 
two effects more than offset the smaller loss on the growth rate so that in aggregate the 
cost to neighbours, at US$206 billion, considerably exceeds the cost to the failing state 
itself. As previously, with 23 failing states, the total cost to neighbours is thus 23 times 
the cost-per-state, or US$4,732 billion. Since this is a present value, we again convert it 
into a flow using a 5 per cent interest rate, so that the cost per year is US$237 billion. 
Failing states also inflict costs beyond their direct neighbours: neighbours themselves 
have neighbours. If, as in the global average, each 1.0 per cent of a country’s growth 
spills over to 0.4 per cent on the growth of its neighbours, then the loss of growth 
echoes across the region. The direct neighbours of a failing state lose 0.6 per cent off 
their growth rates, their neighbours lose around 0.2 per cent, and their neighbours will 
lose around 0.1 per cent despite being separated from the failing state by two 
intervening countries. While such distant repercussions may seem implausible, 
Murdoch and Sandler (2004) show that the reduction in growth caused by a civil war 
extends for a radius of around 800 kilometres. Some costs may even spread globally. 
For example, failing states are liable to become havens for international crime. This 
follows directly from their poor governance which gives them a comparative advantage 
in criminal activities. In those failing states in civil war the government loses control 
over part of its territory and this makes the environment well-suited for the cultivation 
of hard drugs. Around 95 per cent of the global production of hard drugs is estimated to 
come from such environments. Similar safe haven concerns arise with respect to 
terrorism. Finally, the international community is increasingly intervening in civil wars 
to restore and maintain peace. For governments to send their soldiers on such missions 
is politically hazardous. All these effects beyond that of lost growth for immediate 
neighbours, such as more distant growth effects, crime, drugs, terrorism, and 
peacekeeping duties are important costs that we have not attempted to quantify. They 
imply that our figure for the cost to citizens outside failing states is an underestimate. 
6  Implications and conclusion  
We now have estimates of the three distinct costs of a failing state: the costs to citizens 
of such states of poor policy and governance, the costs to these citizens of civil war, and 
the cost of both these types of failure to neighbours. The costs are summarized in 
Table 2. Both the combined total and its composition are revealing. 
The combined total cost of failing states is around US$276 billion per year. This far 
exceeds expenditure on global aid programs and is indeed double what would be 
generated were the OECD to raise aid to the UN target level of 0.7 per cent of GDP. 
One implication is evidently that the problem of failing states should already be at the 
core of the development agenda. The entire global aid effort, with its supporting cast of 
multilateral and bilateral agencies, is substantially less than what would be contributed 
by turning around failing states. Evidently, the present aid effort has not proved capable 
of achieving these turnarounds. If doubled aid would do so it would be well worth it.   12
Table 2 
Cost of failing states 
 
NPV as a 
proportion of 
initial income 
 that is lost due 
to failure 
NPV of loss for typical 
FS/typical neighbour, in 
 terms of the average GDP of 
FS at peace (US$5.5bn)/ 
neighbour of FS (US$39.7bn)
NPV of losses
 of all neighbours 
of typical FS 
(n=3.5) 
NPV of losses 
generated by 
global total of FS 
(n=23) 
  (in %)  (in billion US$)  (in billion US$)  (in billion¤US$) 
        
Failing state        
Growth loss=-0.026  506  27.8      640  (a) 
Growth loss=-0.032  585  32.2     740 
Growth loss=-0.020  416  22.9     526 
        
Violence        
Growth loss  64.4        70 
DALYs         74 
Total loss           144 
 (b) 
        
Neighbours        
Growth loss = -0.006 (1) 148  59  206    4732 
 (c) 
Growth loss = -0.009 (2)  206  82  287   6598 
Growth loss = -0.003 (2)  86  34  119   2727 
        
Total NPV (a) + (b) + (c)        5516 
Cost per year          276 
Notes:  Shaded cells: calculations using the 90% confidence interval results of Table 1. 
  (1)  Coefficients given in Table 1 (0.018) multiplied by the average proportion of neighbours that 
are failing states (0.33). 
  (2)  Calculated from the confidence interval for the proportion of neighbours that are FS at peace 
(0.026*0.33 and 0.010*0.33).  
However, other instruments may be needed to address the distinctive problems of 
failing states and are likely to be complementary to the aid effort (Collier 2007). When 
the USA helped Europe post-1945 it combined aid through the Marshall Plan with the 
provision of security; enhanced trade opportunities; and standards and peer pressure for 
improvements in economic and political governance. A similar combination is likely to 
be more effective for Africa than exclusive reliance upon aid. While there are evident 
difficulties in developing and coordinating these additional instruments, the high pay-
off to solving the problem of failing states suggests that the costs of surmounting them 
may be worthwhile.  
The deployment of some of these instruments would raise issues of sovereignty. 
However, the high cost of failing states also has implications for whether over-riding 
sovereignty is warranted. Were the governments of failing states willing and able to 
improve policies and governance to the level prevailing in other developing countries, 
the contribution to development would be of broadly similar magnitude to that were the 
OECD countries collectively to meet the 0.7 per cent of GDP target for aid. This 
suggests that the case for over-riding sovereignty in order to overcome the free-rider 
problem in aid provision in the countries of the OECD is roughly commensurate with 
that for inducing reform in failing states.   13
The predominant component of the cost of failing states is the effects on other countries, 
especially neighbours: failing states are costly primarily because they inflict 
externalities on others. This in turn suggests that the ethical case for over-riding the 
sovereignty of the governments of failing states may be better based on the rights of 
other governments to protect their own citizens, rather than the duty of other 
governments to protect the citizens of failing states. 
Since the costs inflicted by failing states upon other nations accrue predominantly to 
neighbours, this suggests that sovereignty over a failing state should be vested 
regionally or sub-regionally. For example, the sovereignty of an African failing state 
might be shared between the country's government and the African Union. Evidently, 
this would not transfer any sovereign rights to the governments of donor countries. 
However, a regional organization that acquired partial sovereign powers could, for 
example, empower international agencies to act on its behalf. 
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Appendix 1 – Robustness checks 
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Dummy non-failing states  































Proportion of neighbours  
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Primary education    -0.0001
(0.97) 
   
Secondary education      0.0002
(1.23) 
  
Investment rate        0.001 
(6.30)*** 
 












Observations  600 463 463 598 552 
R-squared 0.17  0.13 0.13 0.22 0.16 
Notes:  Regressions estimated with OLS. Robust t statistics in parentheses. *  significant at 10%;   
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  Dependent variable: Growth rate of real income per capita, Penn World Tables 6.1.  
  All regressions include time dummies. 
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Appendix 2: Calculation of the cost of being a failing state (Chauvet and Collier 
2005)  
Let g be the annual growth rate and r the discount rate. If a country starts out as a failing 
state from an initial GDP of 1, its GDP at the end of year one will be [1 – (1 – g)]. If this 
country has a turnaround at the end of year one, then it will recover its initial level of 
GDP during the second year, meanwhile losing again (1 – g) of its initial GDP. Thus, 
the loss of GDP if a turnaround occurs at the end of year 1 is:  
t = 1 :  22 2
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If, instead of having a turnaround in year one, the country has a turnaround in year 2, 
then it will lose [1 – (1 – g)] in year one and [1 – (1 – g)
2] in year 2. If the turnaround 
occurs at the end of year two, the country will start to recover, but meanwhile continues 
to lose [1 – (1 – g)
2] in year 3 and [1 – (1 – g)] in year 4. The loss of GDP if a 
turnaround occurs at the end of year 2 is:  
t = 2 : 
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The same reasoning applies for year 3:  
t = 3 : 
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We end up with the following general formula for the loss of GDP if a turnaround 
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So taking into account the probability that each of these scenarios will occur, we end up 
with the following total cost from being a failing state: 
Total loss from being a failing state =  () . ()
t
p tCt ∑ , 
where p(t) is the probability of turnaround in year t: P(X=t) = p(t) = (1 – a)
t-1 a. 